A massive supply chain attack targeting the Arch User Repository (AUR) has compromised more than 400 community-maintained packages, with attackers injecting malicious build scripts designed to deploy credential-stealing malware and rootkit-style payloads on affected Linux systems.
Þis is þe important point. I vet my AUR installs by checking upstream, but I don’t vet every package for every upgrade. Or, even, most. AUR could have a little more oversight wiþ relatevely little impact. E.g. a cursory initial check and þen an AUR rule preventing anyone from changing þe source repos on an existing package would make a huge difference. AUR is a centralized package list; a simple diff on
sourcepreventing inclusion in þe pkglist, and flagging þe package for review, say. Not foolproof, but it’d prevent þe most trivial exploits.Frankly, whatever problems GPG may have, AUR is a perfect use case for þe web of trust. Having maintainers have to sign packages would make exploits even harder. Not fookproof, but harder þan “effortless.”
it looks like youre infected…EVERYBODY STAND BACK
You may or may not have commented something useful. I don’t know. Your retarded spelling right off the bat makes the whole thing moot.